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WTO members have presented diverse positions on food aid issues to the current 
round of negotiations on agriculture. Some members desire increased disciplines on 
food aid, while others are adamant that the WTO needs to fulfill past promises and 
meet the current need to increase the food security of developing countries. Underlying 
this debate are questions about the role of the WTO in food aid issues. It is proposed 
that a new, more cohesive institution for food aid be adopted to partner with the WTO.  
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Introduction 
P 
roposals concerned with food aid submitted to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiations on agriculture indicate that members have widely varying 
perspectives on the proper role of the WTO in food aid and security issues. Some 
WTO members desire increased WTO disciplines on food aid, while other members 
are adamant that the WTO should fulfill past promises to increase the food security of 
developing-country importers. The questions underlying these positions are how to 
define the proper role of the WTO with respect to food aid and whether or not a 
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productive balance can be struck between food security and rules to minimize the 
impact of food aid on commodity markets. 
The European Union is negotiating for greater WTO disciplines for food aid 
through increased adherence to the export subsidy disciplines of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), particularly by the United States. In contrast, a 
proposal backed by a coalition of 16 developing countries
2 is focused on the question 
of how the WTO can increase food security in developing countries. Developing-
country governments worry about their ability to import adequate food for their 
people during the period of reform when they expect food prices to be more volatile. 
They propose a Food Financing Facility for food-insecure countries that would be 
administered jointly by the WTO, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  
The gap between these negotiating positions indicates a lack of clarity on the part 
of the WTO about its role in food aid, as food aid policy and disciplines have 
previously been undertaken by other institutions. Now is an excellent time for WTO 
members to reflect on what its role should be. As the URAA dealt with food aid in a 
minimal way, the WTO can consider new directions without contradicting previous 
policy. Negotiations for further reform of WTO rules governing agriculture, including 
food aid and other measures affecting food security, are underway. In the first phase of 
the negotiations, 125 member governments submitted 45 proposals for consideration. 
In the second phase of negotiations, six meetings have been scheduled to discuss topic 
areas in greater detail, with the goal of arriving at proposals for change.  
The Ministerial Declaration from Doha indicates that the WTO intends to give 
priority to the concerns of developing countries, including food security (WTO, 
2001a). While negotiations are underway, many developing countries are not 
committed to further reform of agricultural trade while their wide-ranging concerns on 
the implementation of the last round remain unaddressed. Food security is one of 
those concerns and is prominent in position papers submitted by developing and food-
importing nations to current negotiations. A strong and thoughtful commitment by 
multilateral institutions to reinvent a more cohesive and effective institutional 
structure for food aid, and to properly define the WTO’s role in this structure, might 
go some distance in alleviating the concerns of developing countries. Without 
addressing this larger question the WTO may be unable to find a productive solution 
to concerns of its members. 
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Food Aid Still Matters 
F 
ood aid is used to alleviate hunger due to the occurrence of natural disasters or 
political unrest. Food aid is also used in a wide variety of development projects, 
such as food-for-work in agricultural projects, and human resource projects including 
school feeding, health and nutrition programs. Food aid programs began in the 1950s 
due to the simultaneous existence of agricultural surpluses in the United States and 
Canada and both sporadic and systemic food shortages in many developing countries. 
Since the 1950s other countries have become important food aid donors, and donors 
differ in the importance of humanitarian motives, producer-support, and political 
objectives in their food aid programs. 
A mix of national and multilateral agencies provide food aid. The United States 
continues to be the largest donor of food aid, and in the 1990s provided 40 to 60 
percent of total donations. Canada supplied an average of 609,500 metric tons of food 
aid (largely cereals) over the past ten years, and donations have steadily trended 
downwards since 1992. Multilateral agencies delivered 28 to 42 percent of food aid 
since 1994. Almost all multilateral food aid is delivered through the United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP, 2000). Cereal food aid averaged less than 0.5 percent 
of world cereal production, or around 9 percent of cereal imports by low-income food-
deficit countries (WFP, 2000). Actual deliveries of food aid are illustrated in figure 1 
and exhibit a great deal of variability. Food aid was nearly 13 million metric tons 
(mmt) in 1994, declined to 7.2 mmt in 1996, and doubled to 14.5 mmt in 1999. While 
an increasing variety of foods are used as food aid, cereals continue to account for 
around 87 percent of total food aid.  
Food aid has become a concern for WTO negotiations because food aid levels 
increase in periods of surplus and decline when there are shortages in world markets. 
In addition, food aid can be used as an export subsidy. Tying food aid receipts to 
commercial imports would be a blatant export subsidy, and was forbidden in the 
URAA. The extent to which food aid may be used as an export subsidy in practice is 
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Figure 1. Food Aid Shipments and Minimum Commitments (million metric tons) 
Source: FAO  
Note: FAO and WFP data on total food aid shipments vary to a degree. FAO data is used for this 
graph as a longer time period was available. 
 
The importance of agricultural surpluses in food aid programs has presented a 
problem for both donors and recipients. As donors are largely agricultural exporters, 
their concern has been to use surpluses as food aid and to deliver food aid in a manner 
that would minimize disruption to world markets. In 1954, the Consultative 
Subcommittee of Surplus Disposal (CSSD) of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization was charged with developing protocols for food aid with the goal of 
achieving minimal disruption to commercial agricultural trade. These protocols 
require that those countries that export on a commercial basis to a recipient country be 
notified of most concessional food aid. In addition, the recipient must import its 
“usual marketing requirements”, so that food aid is additional consumption and 
minimizes disruptions to normal commercial trade. The United States is the country 
most frequently singled out in complaints about CSSD violations, due to the size and 
recipients of some U.S. food aid donations. 
For recipients, the importance of surplus disposal in donors’ food aid programs 
has resulted in less food aid during times of global food shortage when prices are high 
and stocks are low (figure 2). In short, the delivery of food aid has been, and to some 
extent continues to be, greatly influenced by availability. The first food aid convention 
was negotiated in 1967 in an attempt to better address recipient needs.  
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Figure 2. Wheat Prices and Wheat Food Aid Shipments   
 
 
The Food Aid Convention (FAC) is a forum in which donors commit to provide a 
minimum amount of food aid for a specified period of time, and the 1967 convention 
guaranteed minimum donor commitments of 4.5 mmt of food aid. This minimum 
commitment rose to 7.5 mmt in 1986, although actual donations have exceeded 
minimum commitments in many years. In 1999, donors to the FAC decreased their 
pledged commitment to 4.8 mmt, the lowest level since the initiation of the program 
33 years earlier (figure 1). It should be borne in mind that actual donations were 
nearly three times commitments in 1999 due to the existence of substantial surpluses. 
Current donor obligations under the FAC are in terms of tons of food, not dollars, 
which should assist in maintaining minimum food aid levels regardless of cereal 
prices in the future. However, in recent years the United States has continued its 
historical pattern of increasing its food aid donations when wheat and other cereal 
stocks are high. 
The Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) (Shapouri, 2001) estimates that for 1997-2000 a substantial gap existed 
between food aid deliveries and food levels required to maintain the level of 
consumption that occurred over the past three years (the status quo) or the level of 
food required to meet nutritional needs. Figure 3 compares estimated needs with food 
aid deliveries and indicates that food aid has fallen short of estimated needs.  
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Figure 3. Actual Food Aid and Food Aid Needs, 1997-1999 
Note: Actual food aid received by 67 countries.  
 
Looking to the future, the Economic Research Service (1999) estimates that food aid 
required to maintain per capita consumption at 1996-98 levels in 67 developing 
countries is 13 mmt, while the food gap to meet minimum nutritional requirements is 
estimated to be 15 mmt. In meetings of the Agriculture Committee of the WTO, 
representatives of the FAO have repeatedly emphasized that the food security of least-
developed and net-food-importing countries remains precarious. The FAO estimates 
that one-sixth of the developing world’s 800 million people do not have access to 
sufficient food to lead healthy and productive lives, and other analysts have concluded 
that developing countries are experiencing a decline in food security (IFPRI, 1998).  
Food Aid in the Uruguay Round Agreement  
T 
he Uruguay Round Agreement addresses food aid in the Agreement on 
Agriculture and in a Ministerial Decision. Article 10.4 of the URAA states that 
(1) food aid shall not be tied to commercial exports of agricultural products to 
recipient countries; (2) food aid must be carried out in accordance with the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s “Principles of Surplus Disposal and Consultative 
Obligations”; and (3) food aid must be provided fully in grant form or meet the terms 
for concessional food aid as provided in Article 4 of the 1986 Food Aid Convention. 
These rules incorporate the use of protocols and multilateral institutions that 
developed over a long period of time. 
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Food aid was one of the concerns voiced by least-developed countries (LDCs) and 
net-food-importing countries (NFIDCs), which anticipated difficulties in importing 
adequate supplies of food on reasonable terms during the implementation of Uruguay 
Round reforms. These concerns were addressed in a ministerial decision
3 
(subsequently referred to as the NFIDC Decision) that was adopted as a part of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement. The NFIDC Decision committed the WTO to: 
•  review the level of food aid established by the Committee on Food Aid 
under the Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the 
appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to 
meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform 
programme; 
•  adopt guidelines to ensure that an increasing percentage of basic foodstuffs 
is provided to least-developed and net-food-importing developing countries 
fully in grant form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with 
Article 4 of the Food Aid Convention 1986; and 
•  give full consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests 
for the provision of technical and financial assistance to least-developed 
and net-food-importing countries to improve their agricultural productivity 
and infrastructure.  
Concerns Regarding Implementation 
A 
n obvious difficulty presented by the NFIDC Decision is the ambiguity of its 
language, which makes it difficult for parties to agree whether or not these 
commitments have been met. The WTO did review food aid levels and did initiate 
negotiations under the Food Aid Convention, resulting in the 1999 FAC Agreement. 
The result of the convention was unsatisfactory to some countries as the minimum 
level of commitment by donors declined. For that reason and others, statements by 
many developing countries indicate they do not consider that commitments made by 
the WTO have been met. Eleven developing countries state in their position paper that 
“Despite the promises, there has been no political will to activate the Marrakesh 
Decision in order to address the problems of net-food-importing developing countries 
(NFIDCs). This had been the avenue by which developing countries expected to 
receive compensation for the negative effects of liberalization” (WTO, 2000a).   
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This failure is one reason for reluctance on the part of many developing countries to 
negotiate for further reforms (Bridges Weekly Trade Digest, 2000a; Bridges Weekly 
Trade Digest, 2000b; WTO, 2001b).  
In December 2000 the General Council of the WTO instructed the Agriculture 
Committee to examine problems faced by food-importing developing countries, in 
particular how to more effectively implement the NFIDC Decision (WTO, 2001b). 
This committee has identified three issues in discussions over implementation: a food 
financing facility, and both technical and financial assistance for improving 
agricultural productivity and infrastructure.  
Negotiating Positions 
W 
hile food security and agricultural development are prominent concerns in 
position papers, only a few countries and trading blocs specifically address 
food aid. Proposals from developed exporting nations reflect concern that food aid 
may be used by other exporting nations to circumvent their export subsidy restrictions, 
with an adverse impact on agricultural markets. The European Union’s position 
requests implicit export subsidies such as food aid be disciplined in conjunction with 
export subsidy disciplines. The EU submission includes the following specific 
proposals concerning food aid (WTO, 2000b): 
•  Food aid should be given only in grant form and only to least-developed 
and net-food-importing developing countries. 
•  A code of conduct covering food aid operations should be established.  
•  The type of operations to be considered as food aid should be clearly 
defined; 
•  Notifications should be mandatory and always ex ante not ex post.  
•  A list of recipients should be established and criteria for emergency 
situations developed. 
The United States has not advanced specific proposals for food aid (WTO, 2000c) 
beyond the status quo. The U.S. proposal requests: 
•  continuation of current disciplines in Article 10.4;  
•  renewal of  donor commitment to food aid; and  
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Proposals from developing countries focus on the potential role that food aid plays 
in food security. India discusses food aid within the context of food security   
(WTO, 2001b) and: 
•  supports criteria on food aid to ensure that food aid is distinct from export 
subsidies; and  
•  states that food aid should be offered regardless of the world market price.  
Egypt proposes (WTO, 2001c) that: 
•  the NFIDC Decision be reviewed and strengthened; and 
•  a fund be created for NFIDCs and LDCs, which would obtain a rebate on 
their food import bills after they have purchased their requirements on the 
open market at unsubsidized prices. The fund would be financed from a 
number of sources, prominent amongst which would be international 
financial organizations, specialized UN agencies, developed-country 
donors, and major exporters.
5 
A group of developing countries including the MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and Chile, Bolivia, and Costa Rica (WTO, 2000d) 
propose that food aid to NFIDCs should be given without commercial conditions and 
fully in grant form. Finally, the only point on food aid made by the CAIRNS group 
(WTO, 2000e) is that additional disciplines are needed on “non-commercial 
transactions” and export credits and credit guarantees. Some donors and recipients 
share the desire for food aid to be distinct from export subsidies and market 
development programs and for it to be given as aid in grant form. Other position 
papers state that, as recipient-country food aid needs and circumstances are diverse, 
limits on the form of food aid may not serve a useful purpose. 
Egypt’s idea for a food import fund has been further developed by 16 countries 
that are negotiating for a Food Financing Facility (F3)
6 in the Agriculture 
Committee’s work on implementation issues. The Food Financing Facility is proposed 
as a 1.4 billion-dollar fund that would provide a short-term safety net for importing 
countries facing difficulties in financing normal commercial requirements of basic 
foodstuffs. Egypt argues that such a fund would increase the confidence of countries 
facing adjustment that they would be able to meet their food import needs.   
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The November 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial 
T 
he Doha Ministerial produced three declarations, including one that addressed 
implementation issues. In this declaration (WTO, 2001d) the signatories 
promised to “take note” of the recommendations forwarded by the Committee on 
Agriculture (WTO, 2001e) including: 
•  Early action should be taken within the framework of the Food Aid 
Convention by donors and the UN World Food Programme to review 
donations to better meet the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs. 
•  WTO members should take measures to ensure that levels of food aid to 
developing countries are maintained in periods of high prices.  
•  Food aid to less-developed and net-food-importing developing countries 
should be in grant form.  
•  An interagency panel should be developed, including the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, to explore the 
food financing revolving loan.  
Developing countries had asked for much more (WTO, 2001d). They had asked 
that developed-country donors maintain reserves that would be released at reasonable 
prices to LDCs and NFIDCs in times of shortage, and that WTO member 
commitments of food aid, the volume of physical reserve, and contributions to the 
food financing revolving fund be a part of legally enforceable country schedules.
7 The 
level of commitment by the WTO to food insecurity issues continues in the same vein, 
where encouraging donors to address food aid issues, and urging other multilateral 
agencies to act is the route, rather than incorporating enforceable disciplines into 
WTO agreements.  
Options for Reform: Status Quo Institutional 
Arrangements 
P 
roposals for criteria to determine what qualifies as food aid may be motivated by 
past and potential abuse of food aid by donors. In addition to humanitarian goals, 
food aid has been used by many donors to achieve political and commercial objectives 
(Ruttan, 1996; Barrett, 1999; Christensen, 1999). Food aid has been used, particularly 
by the United States, as a mechanism to dispose of excessive commodity stocks and as 
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The marginal changes discussed in this section can be made within the current 
institutional structure for food aid, subject to the caveats discussed in the conclusion 
to this section. However, these disciplines are not likely to meet the concerns of 
developing countries.  
Food Aid in Grant Form 
O 
ne criterion for food aid is that it be given solely in grant form. Several countries 
and institutions have taken steps in this direction.  
•  The NFIDC Decision states that an increasing percentage of food aid 
should be on grant terms (or on a concessional basis as in the FAC  
Article 4).  
•  Under the 1999 Food Aid Convention, donors agreed that all food aid to 
least-developed countries through the FAC would be in the form of grants. 
With the exception of the United States, all donors through the FAC 
currently provide 100 percent of their food aid on grant terms. For the 
United States this figure varied between 83 percent and 93 percent of U.S. 
food aid between 1995/96 and 1998/99 (WTO, 2000f). 
Of the major food aid donors, the United States is the only one that continues food 
aid programs that are not in grant form, although the importance of credit programs 
has declined in recent years. The most prominent food aid program that operates on a 
concessional basis, (subsidized credit) is the U.S. PL 480 Title I Program, which has a 
stated goal of promoting U.S. agricultural exports. Negotiators should consider 
moving Title I discussions from food aid to export credits discussions (Young, Abbott 
and Leetmaa, 2001). Negotiating PL 480 Title I in the context of export credit 
negotiations may meet both donor and recipient-country desires to eliminate unclear 
distinctions between some food aid programs and export credit programs. 
Food Aid Recipients 
Other important criteria are those that define which countries should receive food aid.  
•  Under the 1999 FAC, donors agreed to give priority to least-developed
8 and 
lower-income developing countries. Other eligible recipients are lower-
middle-income developing countries and all others on the WTO list of 
NFIDCs
9 when they are experiencing food emergencies and when food aid 
is targeted at vulnerable groups.  
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•  The UN World Food Programme’s (WFP) governing body set a goal that 
90 percent of the WFP’s development assistance be directed to low-income 
food-deficit (LIFD) countries and 50 percent to least-developed countries. 
The WFP directed 60 percent of its expenditures in the year 2000 to least-
developed countries and 89 percent towards LIFD countries, percentages 
that have been fairly stable in recent years (WFP, 2001). 
•  The European Union adopted regulation 1296/96 in 1996 defining the legal 
framework for EU food aid, which mandates that EU aid focus on the most 
vulnerable countries. The EU Commission states that with two exceptions 
(Peru and Palestine) all recipients of EU aid are LIFDCs (European 
Commission, 2000).  
However, while careful targeting of food aid is a stated goal of the EU, larger than 
normal global food aid flows in 1999 were largely due to donations by the EU of 0.5 
mmt and the U.S. of 1.9 mmt of cereals to Russia, which is not a LIFDC. 
In the United States, food aid is administered both by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 
The strategic plan adopted by USAID states that emergency programs must be 
directed to meeting the critical food needs of targeted populations. However, the 
programs administered by the USDA do not appear to follow guidelines similar to 
those of the EU and the WFP, as only 17 of 45 countries receiving Section 416b food 
aid are on the list of least-developed and net-food-importing developing countries. It 
is important to note that in 1999 the United States also donated 1.5 mmt of food to the 
WFP through the Section 416b program, donations which the WFP praised as 
instrumental in meeting the increased needs for emergency food aid of priority 
populations (Shortley, 2001). 
A Definition of Food Aid 
A 
s establishment of criteria for food aid has been a troublesome issue in the past 
(FAO, 1992), it may be useful to undertake negotiations to categorize 
transactions that are clearly food aid and those where disagreement exists. The 
Consultative Committee on Surplus Disposal has operated since 1954 under the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. This committee has a 
comprehensive list of transactions that could serve as a basis for negotiations on the 
types of transactions that constitute food aid. Transactions that are widely agreed upon 
as constituting food aid could be unrestricted and free from challenge. Another 
category could include transactions that are not uniformly considered food aid, such as 
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programs with overriding market-development objectives, and these could be subject 
to tighter consultation and notification requirements, and to overall limitations. 
Another category of food aid considered contentious in notification procedures is 
programme food aid (Shortley, 2001; Hildebrand, 2001). Programme food aid is 
normally given to recipient countries for sale on the open market, with proceeds going 
to support budgetary and balance-of-payments objectives. According to Shortley and 
Hildebrand, food aid distributed as food to targeted populations is usually not 
controversial.  
A Caveat on Negotiating Disciplines in the WTO 
F 
irst and foremost, the goal of the WTO is to reduce distortions to trade. The 
danger in negotiating food aid issues in the context of the WTO is that other and 
more pressing questions will remain unspoken and unanswered. These questions 
include whether or not the level of food aid guaranteed through the Food Aid 
Convention is adequate, how to target aid to meet the needs and concerns of recipients 
as well as donors, and how to use food aid effectively in the development process. The 
expertise that has developed on these questions largely resides in other institutions, 
such as the World Food Programme, individual country development and aid 
agencies, and private voluntary organizations. With its current mandate, the WTO is 
not an appropriate venue to balance the trade concerns of donor nations, which 
predominate in the WTO, with the food security concerns of many developing 
countries. If the WTO chooses to negotiate further disciplines for food aid it should 
err on the side of meeting the interests of recipient nations, whose concerns are more 
pressing than donor-country concerns over small potential impacts on market share 
and prices.  
A New Institutional Structure for Food Aid 
A 
nother option is for the WTO to spearhead the development of a new 
multilateral institutional structure for food aid. The current structure for food aid 
is unwieldy and uncoordinated, and has been the subject of criticism over a long 
period of time (Talbot, 1990; Ruttan, 1996). Currently, there is no single institution 
that has both the responsibility and the power to effectively coordinate food aid policy 
between donors and recipients and to address major international crises.   Below is a 
brief description of the major players in food aid. This list does not include other 
institutions that are primarily concerned with promoting food security through 
agricultural development.  
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•  The World Food Programme provides emergency and project food aid to 
recipient countries. As WFP programmes are not supported by UN dues, 
the WFP works with donors to develop programs and solicit donations. 
Many other UN agencies are concerned with food aid, including the UN 
High Commission on Refugees and the Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs; however, they are not responsible for delivering food aid.  
•  The World Food Summit, supported by the FAO, brings together a large 
and diverse group concerned with food security to set goals and discuss 
policy. The development and implementation of national action plans to 
meet those goals is the responsibility of sovereign nations. The FAO 
Committee on World Food Security is responsible for monitoring progress 
towards World Food Summit goals. 
•  The FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) has 
been the primary international vehicle for notification and consultation over 
food aid and concessional transactions since 1954. Protocols govern which 
transactions require that exporters be notified, some on an ex ante and 
others on an ex post basis. Over the last ten years an average of 62 percent 
of food aid shipments have undergone notification through the CSSD. 
•  The World Trade Organization has a mandate to provide rules governing 
trade, including food aid. To date, the WTO has played a minimal role in 
developing rules for food aid and has referred to protocols adopted by the 
FAO’s CSSD. In addition, the WTO took on poorly defined responsibilities 
for the food security of developing nations by adopting the Ministerial 
Decision on the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on 
Least-Developed and Net-Food-Importing Developing Countries. 
•  The Food Aid Committee of the International Grains Council sets 
minimum levels of food aid guaranteed by donors. 
•  The World Food Council, until it dissolved in 1993, was an annual forum 
composed largely of Ministers of Agriculture who met to discuss food 
security issues, including food aid. 
•  National food aid programs maintained by the United States, the EU 
Commission, Canada, Japan and many European countries and other 
national governments give food aid both bilaterally and through the WFP. 
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•  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are used by national food aid 
programs and the WFP to deliver food aid and implement programs. NGOs 
also are food aid donors and play active roles in contributing to food 
security policy in international venues and advocating for food aid funding. 
Previous authors have criticized current institutional arrangements for food aid as 
lacking the power and responsibility to effectively coordinate international food aid 
programs. Shaw and Clay (1998) argue a body similar to that of the disbanded World 
Food Council would not work. They believe its failure was due to establishment of the 
World Food Council as a separate body without executing authority and with a 
mandate that cut across that of other agencies. 
The Overseas Development Council proposes that the UN should develop a high-
level agency concerned with economic security: 
A “UN economic security council” has been advocated as a decision-
making forum at the highest level to review threats to global human 
security and to provide a structure to deal with issues of world governance 
and world action vis-à-vis poverty and social needs in a systematic and 
politically realistic way. The Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries 
and the Group of Fifteen (G15) developing countries have been called 
upon to establish a joint high-level steering committee for sustainable food 
and nutrition security. Whatever decisions are taken on UN reform, a focal 
point is needed on food security at the highest political level, to ensure that 
it remains a central issue in action for economic and social development 
and peace, with cohesive and co-ordinated programmes of international 
development assistance. (ODI, 1997, p. 7)  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to say how an optimal institutional 
structure for food aid would look, several features for a cohesive structure can be 
identified. It would be useful to have an institution that was involved in both setting 
the rules and specifying minimum levels for food so that a balance between the two 
objectives could be achieved. This would necessitate having both donors and 
recipients involved in the process in a significant way. This institution could draw on 
the food aid expertise that exists in many multilateral organizations and could provide 
the protocols needed by the WTO without becoming a part of the WTO. The WTO 
could draw on the new organization for expertise just as it draws on the on the Codex 
Alimentarius and the International Plant Protection Organization to develop 
international sanitary and phytosanitary standards. 
The WTO needs to define its role in food aid. A status quo approach has inherent 
limitations, and WTO adoption of disciplines needs to be balanced with the objective 
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of providing adequate food aid. A bolder initiative on food security might assure 
developing nations that their legitimate food needs will be met while they open their 
borders. Their perception that the WTO has failed to fully implement the NFIDC 
Decision indicates that this assurance has not been provided. In a recent meeting LDC 
governments “expressed their determination to reverse the marginalization of our 
countries in international trade and enhance LDCs’ effective participation in the 
multilateral trading system” (Bridges, 2001). While the Doha Ministerial went some 
distance in recognizing that the food security issues of NFIDCS need to be addressed, 
the WTO has yet to clearly articulate its role in food aid. Strengthening and 
reorganizing the current institutional structure for food aid would go some distance 
toward bringing developing countries into what was once named the “developing 
country round”. 
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Endnotes 
1.  The author gratefully acknowledges support for this research from Economic 
Research Service of the USDA. 
2.  Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela. 
3.  Ministerial Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the 
Reform Programme on Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries. 
4.  This statement is taken verbatim from the U.S. position and its meaning is unclear. 
However, it is possible that it means the U.S. wants to discipline export taxes. 
5.  See Trueblood and Shapouri (2000) for a discussion of an import insurance 
program that could provide a replacement for food aid programs.  
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Economics in International Trade. 
6.  Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela are supporting the proposal.  
7.  As proposed disciplines on food aid would apply to donors, and all major donors 
are WTO members, almost all food aid would be covered by a WTO agreement 
although some recipients are not members of the WTO. This is also true of current 
disciplines through other agreements, as almost all donors are members.  
8.  Least developed countries as recognized by the UN include: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verdi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia. 
9.  The WTO list of net-food-importing developing countries includes: Barbados, 
Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, St. Lucia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
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